Bitcoin developers are weighing a new post-quantum signature candidate that its authors say could harden the network against future quantum attacks, but the proposal carries a built-in hazard: if wallet software mishandles a one-time key, an attacker could forge a signature and drain the address.
Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick and post-quantum researcher Mikhail Kudinov published a security analysis of SHRINCS on Nov. 19, 2026, alongside a draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal. The scheme is hash-based and roots its security in SHA-256, a primitive Bitcoin already depends on, which keeps the trust assumptions narrow compared with schemes that would introduce new cryptographic math.
The draft is not approved, and the authors are soliciting outside review. "We need all the possible feedback - engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers," Kudinov said. "There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise."
At the center of the design are two spending paths with sharply different risk profiles and data footprints.
Note: Sizes are as reported in the published analysis; current signature sizes are typical values for Bitcoin transactions.
The compact stateful route keeps transactions manageable, but each key can safely sign only once. A wallet that reuses a one-time state by accident hands an attacker the ability to forge a signature for that address and take the funds. Nick has described that outcome as catastrophic and argues it must be impossible for a user to trigger on their own. "Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly," he said during a recent appearance on MARA Foundation TV.
His proposed rule for production software is blunt: whenever a state counter could be compromised in any way, the specification and the wallet should fall back to the stateless path automatically, without prompting the user.
That safety net is expensive. Stateless signatures are far larger than the 64- and 71-byte signatures Bitcoin uses today, so fewer transactions fit in each block. Nick said the long-run effect on fees is unknown and that the change reaches beyond pricing. "It's also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin," he said. "And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin."
Both paths are being optimized, with some of the work aided by AI-assisted research, according to Nick. The working group includes researchers backed by nonprofits including Brink and OpenSats, and the specification remains a draft.
Why the migration matters extends past cryptography. Every Bitcoin spend passes through a signature check, so replacing the scheme is a multiyear coordination effort spanning wallets, exchanges, custody providers and node operators. SHRINCS offers a conservative route by avoiding new assumptions beyond SHA-256, but the efficiency-versus-safety trade-off lands squarely on wallet teams, which must enforce key-state tracking in code that users never see.
Implementation failure, not broken cryptography, has driven some of the sector's largest losses. The FBI warned in November 2026 that North Korean hackers stole $400 million through fake meetings, a reminder that operational mistakes remain a primary vector for theft.
The first real test of whether SHRINCS can move from research to production will be how wallet developers respond to the mandatory stateless-fallback requirement. Until then, the proposal's viability hinges on feedback from the network's stakeholders and further refinement of the specification.
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