By experts and staff

  • Benn SteilCFR ExpertSenior Fellow and Director of International Economics
  • Yuma SchusterAnalyst, Greenberg Center for Geoeconomics

On October 29, hackers—allegedly North Korean—stole $6.4 billion in assets from Binance—the largest cryptocurrency exchange in the world. The theft triggered $5.3 billion of customer withdrawals in two days—nearly as much as was pulled from FTX just before its collapse in 2022. Binance has mostly repaid its customers, using its own reserves. But if a stablecoin issuer—such as Tether, which had $31 million stolen in a 2017 hacking—were to be robbed of $6.4 billion, equivalent to 80 percent of its excess of assets over liabilities, the resulting panic-selling could trigger turmoil in U.S. funding markets.

To understand how, we show in the lefthand figure above the evolution in holdings of Tether’s dollar-pegged stablecoin, USDT—the El Salvador-based cryptocurrency in which most Binance customers withdrew their funds after the hack—and that of the main competing dollar stablecoin, USDC, which is issued by U.S.-based Circle. As can be seen, USDT has surged in usage since 2022, giving it 61 percent of the stablecoin market today.

The source of this difference lies in where each coin’s circulation growth has occurred. Though we have only consolidated data on stablecoin holdings in advanced and developing economies, and do not have it broken down by issuer, an examination of the consolidated data by country group, and the consolidated data by issuer, reveals a radical split in which stablecoin is being used where. This finding has regulatory implications.

Here is what we found.

Stablecoin holdings in emerging markets and developing economies (EMs), shown by the dashed red line in the middle figure, have risen by $103 billion since 2022—nearly as much as the entire $109 billion rise in circulating USDT. By contrast, stablecoin holdings in advanced economies, as shown by the dashed green line, have grown only $11 billion.

Since stablecoins in circulation (solid lines) roughly equal1 the holdings by country group (dashed lines), the four lines together allow an estimation of USDT and USDC shares by country group.

In the conservative case, even if all $26 billion in circulating USDC since 2022 had been held by EMs, and all $11 billion in advanced economies stablecoin circulation had been USDT, EMs would still have accounted for 70 percent of the global rise in USDT. But the right-hand figure suggests that this figure is much higher. The dominance of the orange area shows that in Brazil, where the most stablecoins among EMs (excluding China) are held, USDT is overwhelmingly the preferred stablecoin for conversion to traditional currency. Notwithstanding a “constrained” financial stability rating by S&P Global in 2023, and a downgrade to “weak” in 2025, owing to higher-risk asset backing, USDT has averaged 86 percent of trading volume. USDC, in contrast, despite a superior “strong” score, owing to its lower-risk asset backing, has averaged just 7 percent over that period. Other stablecoins comprise the remaining 7 percent share of trading volume.

The dominance is flipped for advanced economies. The IMF estimates that in 2024, USDC transfers comprised half of all stablecoin transfers in Europe, where the EU Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation allows only stablecoins backed by highly liquid and low-risk assets to be listed on crypto exchanges. The same estimate finds that USDC comprised 61 percent of stablecoin transfers in North America in 2024. And with the U.S. GENIUS Act requiring all stablecoins to be backed by approved liquid assets starting in January 2027, USDC will gain a similar regulatory advantage over El Salvador-based USDT.

Without similar regulation restricting foreign-issued stablecoins in emerging markets, USDT will be able to continue growing in circulation, and its issuer, Tether, will continue accumulating reserves in the assets that back USDT. That means that for every USDT in circulation, roughly 27 percent of the reserves backing it at Tether will be risky assets such as Bitcoin, gold, and secured loans to counterparties whose credibility is unknown.

Now imagine that on October 29 hackers had stolen $6.4 billion of Bitcoin from Tether. Its Bitcoin, which has no centralized issuer, could not have been frozen to block transfers—the very reserves Tether would need to repay customers would be irrecoverable. A $6.4 billion theft would erase nearly all of the $8 billion cushion Tether keeps beyond the value of its liabilities, causing customers to doubt whether each USDT could still be redeemed for a dollar. If stablecoin holders and market makers alike doubted USDT’s full redeemability, it could continue falling in value. To the extent that redemptions continued, Tether would need to draw from its $123 billion stash of U.S. Treasury reserves to repay panicked customers in cash. A complete liquidation of Tether’s Treasuries would amount to about half of the $236 billion sold by mutual funds in the first quarter of 2020, which forced the Fed to intervene with emergency Treasury purchases to stabilize prices. With Treasury prices now hovering near 20-year lows, Tether would be selling into an already fragile market, where sudden Treasury sales—particularly if exacerbated by a broader stablecoin sell-off—could require even greater Fed intervention.

What is to be done?

Legislation like the U.S. GENIUS Act and the EU MiCA regulation, which establish guardrails that require stablecoins offered on crypto exchanges to be backed by safe, liquid assets, needs to be passed in EMs—where such stablecoins have been accumulating. Without tighter regulation of stablecoin reserve requirements in EMs, on par with that in the U.S. and EU, these countries will be a growing source of vulnerability for the U.S. and global economy. To ensure such regulation is implemented, the IMF should provide model stablecoin legislation that can be easily transposed into domestic law, and require adoption in high-usage countries as a condition for borrowing from the Fund. The IMF successfully used such a lever to get El Salvador to make significant changes to its Bitcoin laws in 2025. It is time to take that lever global.

This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

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