A technical discussion around Kaspa Dollar has turned into a broader debate about what decentralization should actually mean for miner-based oracle systems.

KaspaClass questioned the project’s proposed oracle design, pointing out that if two or three mining pools produce most blocks, thousands of individual price votes could still effectively come from only a handful of operators.

That concern cuts straight to the core of Kaspa Dollar’s architecture.

The project plans to use miners themselves as price reporters. Each block can include a KAS price vote, and the protocol then takes the median across a valid voting window. Anyone can later post the resulting price on-chain together with a zero-knowledge proof showing that the votes came from actual Kaspa blocks and were aggregated correctly.

What you'll learn 👉

The Decentralization Question Is About Who Controls the Hashrate

On paper, the design ties oracle influence to mining power.

A valid price window needs at least 50% of blocks to carry a vote, and moving the median requires control over roughly half of the voting share. The protocol also plans an initial launch gate where 90% of blocks must participate for 30 consecutive days before activation.

The complication raised by KaspaClass is that hashrate and operator count are not the same thing.

If a small number of mining pools dominate block production, the oracle could technically receive thousands of votes but still depend heavily on decisions made by only a few entities.

Uhhhh, I like! Having miners include real time data about real world facts directly in their blocks and use them to provide decentralized oracle services, sounds like a really interesting idea. The oracles could become their own economic actors that collect fees for consuming their latest values that could then be re-distributed to the miners that update these values. That would not only create an incentive for miners to actually provide this data but it would also provide a completely new funding mechanism for PoW itself. And I don’t even think that you have to constrain yourself to weighing these oracles by the amount of PoW – you could most probably also build an oracle that aggregates existing attestors in other chains like chainlink, or larger dexes to tap into another dimension of existing decentralization. Such a "merge-mining of data" would turn Kaspa into an aggregation layer for all kinds of forms of decentralized trust.

That does not make the system centralized in the traditional sense, but it does mean pool concentration becomes much more important once miners are doing more than ordering transactions.

They would also be helping define real-world data used by financial applications.

Michael Sutton Sees the Oracle as an Incentive to Decentralize Mining

Kaspa researcher Michael Sutton responded from a different angle.

Rather than treating current pool concentration as permanent, he argued that widespread adoption of miner-attestation services should create a new reason for the Kaspa ecosystem to decentralize mining further.

His point is essentially economic.

If Kaspa wants to sell what he describes as real-time decentralization as a service, then the community has a stronger incentive to make the underlying mining layer as distributed as possible.

That turns the criticism into a potential feedback mechanism.

The more valuable miner-based oracle services become, the more important mining decentralization becomes. And if miners can earn additional fees from providing reliable data, there may be a stronger economic case for expanding participation.

Read also: Kaspa Price Warning: Bulls Need to Defend THIS Level Now

Hans Moog Sees Something Much Bigger Than a Stablecoin Oracle

Hans Moog took the discussion another step.

He argued that having miners place real-world data directly into blocks could become a new economic layer for proof-of-work networks.

In his model, oracle services could charge fees to applications consuming their latest values, then redistribute those fees back to miners who provide the data.

That would give PoW miners a revenue source beyond block rewards and transaction fees.

Moog also argued that the system does not necessarily need to rely only on Kaspa’s own mining power.

A future oracle could theoretically aggregate outside attestors such as Chainlink feeds, decentralized exchanges or other blockchain-based data sources, creating several independent sources of trust rather than relying on one dimension of decentralization.

He described the broader idea as something close to “merge-mining of data,” where Kaspa becomes an aggregation layer for decentralized trust.

Kaspa Dollar Is Still an Experimental Design

That distinction is important.

Kaspa Dollar is not live yet.

The current whitepaper is still a working document subject to review, testnet deployment is planned for May 2027, and mainnet is currently targeted for September 2027 if development, testing and audits proceed as planned.

The proposed oracle also contains several safeguards.

If no valid price appears for 30 minutes, price-dependent actions such as minting, withdrawing and liquidation stop. The protocol also caps how quickly the mint price can rise and how quickly the liquidation price can fall, reducing the damage from sudden manipulation or extreme volatility.

None of that completely answers the pool-concentration question.

But that may be exactly why this discussion matters.

Kaspa Dollar started as a stablecoin proposal, yet the more interesting debate may now be about something broader: can proof-of-work miners become decentralized providers of real-world data, and can the economic value of that service actually push mining toward greater decentralization?

If that works, Kaspa’s miner-attestation model could become much more important than a price oracle for one stablecoin.

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